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Cloning and Commodification
transcribedremarks of
MARGARET JANE RADIN*

I'm echoing the chorus of thanks to the Hastings Law Journal.
The journal has done a beautiful job and we have all been made to
feel like visiting VIPs, so thank you very much, well done.
As my ex-colleague Alex Capron mentioned, I've been thinking
about commodification for some time, but I haven't thought enough
about the science of cloning. I learned a lot about the science from
the committee report, which was a beautiful job, and also from the
other speakers today. I do have the benefit of that, but I hope to
learn more in the future. There are two important things I said in all
this discussion about commodification-perhaps these are the only
two things you need to know. One is that it's a complicated issue full
of double binds and dependant on nuanced evaluation; it's not
reducible to sound bites. The second thing is, and maybe this is the
more important discussion for today: a mere gut response, as in,
"commodification, ugh" isn't a good enough reason to resist it. The
reason I got started writing about commodification is that I thought,
we could say things other than "I hate this, ugh." We need to have a
better response than "ugh." So I'm joining the chorus against Dr.
Kass' article, which I haven't read, but people here have made sound
awful. I'm adding, provisionally, awaiting my reading of it, that I
deplore his being able to stack the committee that will now make
pronouncements in our name. I suspect that the dissent from people
like those in this room is going to be very important, and that now is
not the time to be silent.
Commodification and commercialization is basically the topic
I'm going to talk about a little bit, as well as the notion that regulation
can be thought of as incomplete commodification. The concept of
commodification is related to commercialization. The concept posits
that there is some kind of strong distinction, ethically, culturally, or
morally, between a donative system where you give things, and a
profit and exchange system where you have economic exchange and
profit. There are two issues. One is, what is the ethical support for
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each of these systems, and two, can they actually be held apart in
practice, even if we have an ethical distinction between a donative
system and an exchange system? In exchange systems, which I think
of as pure commodification and commercialization, the infrastructure
that holds sway is the infrastructure of the functioning market-that
is, property and contract law. I used to theorize property, and now I
theorize contract, but they're interrelated. They each have their own
limitations, but if you are a theorist who believes the market is the
only way to think about justice, then you think that property as
entitlement and contract as transfer exhaust the theory of justice.
The late, great Robert Nozick did think that, and for good reason, as
he was a market theorist. So, if some things become part of a
commercial structure and become subject to property and contract,
that can create the implicit propertization of things that were
formerly non-property. This is what has happened to eggs, for
example. They were pretty clearly non-property at the time I was
writing, some of the first of my work on commodification, and now
they've become fairly well-propertized, just through the prospect of
entering a market.
The objections to commodification are primarily objections to
giving market status to some object that is important to human
beings. These objects are usually things close to personhood and
things we think of maybe as internal to personhood or as constitutive
of personhood, rather than things that can be thought of as external.
Here I'm borrowing from a long Kantian legacy-that's one way to
theorize it, though not the only one. What exactly is important about
non-market status? What exactly is it about being not of the market?
Here is where the theory should go deeper. It's possible that what
makes people upset about market status for things that are selfconstitutive or related to personhood is that there are monetary
equivalents, and not that there are actual transactions. It's possible
that merely thinking about something as a transaction is
objectionable, and I call this market rhetoric. The people at Chicago
starting with Nobel Laureate Gary Becker have pursued this rhetoric
to great depths in applying it to families. The monetary equivalents
could be in thought (market rhetoric) rather than in action (actual
markets). Or we could be merely objecting to fungibility-that is, the
idea that something has become standardized and more like a product
which has the same indicia in all its instantiations and is not unique
enough. If we want to call that commodification, even if there is no
money, that's a different way of thinking about commodification than
if there is money involved. So there are some nuances on what's
involved in commodification, and I think they are important in trying
to apply this concept to cloning.
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I do want to say here, and maybe this is my main point, that
commodification is both liberating and threatening in many
circumstances, and that it's often impossible to brand it as one or the
other. Markets are experienced as liberating. Not to have everything
dependent on social status was experienced as liberating, and there
are a lot of countries in the world that experienced transition to
markets as liberating, and people who weren't able to buy things
because of race or class still experience markets as liberating. Some
say the Internet is liberating because nobody can tell who you are
when you're on the Internet. So, because commodification is both
liberating and threatening, there are recurrent arguments on both
sides. Make people free to have children and you're enhancing their
autonomy and personhood, or make people more market-oriented in
self-conception and you're diminishing their autonomy and
personhood. So we had people who argued diminishing autonomy
and personhood, because people are becoming market-oriented in
self conception, but we had other people who argued we're going to
become free to have children which is really important to us, thereby
enhancing our autonomy and selfhood. I think that the duality of
these arguments is not going to go away. There's no self-evident
answer.
I think though, that application of the notion of commodification
to ideas of cloning is not that easy. I think, for example, that with
contract pregnancy, it's easier. Contract pregnancy is called "babyselling," unless it's called commercial surrogacy. I have never seen a
viable difference between the two because I don't think the identity
of the sperm donor changes the nature of the transaction from a sale
to something else. So that issue has seemed easy to me, although
perhaps that's controversial. I think with cloning it's a little harder
because there's no actual sale of a baby, or even something that looks
like the sale of a baby. There are things which might be troublesome
from the point of view of fungibility, objectification, or particularly
from the point of view of whether the donor economy is what's really
going on. I'm going to come to that later, but (at least to me) cloning
doesn't look the same as commercial surrogacy looks.
Which brings me to incomplete commodification and thinking of
regulation as incomplete commodification. Now, I think there's an
awful lot of incomplete commodification in the world. I think a lot of
things that people think of as being market transactions are not fully
commodified, as in not fully laissez-faire property and contract, but
have a lot of other kinds of protections built in to protect human
beings in their self-constitution in various ways. I think one reason
we have regulation like that is to preserve the non-market aspects of
being human. But what are we going to attack when we try to use a
regime of incomplete commodification? One thing to do is to attack
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the indicia of commodification by saying I don't want to see market
exchange, I just want to see gift. Or you can say I don't want to see
market rhetoric so let's please not talk about exchange transactions,
transaction costs, demand curves, and ownership. Instead, let's talk
about this in a different rhetoric. You can be attacking fungibility,
asking to please preserve uniqueness, and to avoid thinking that this
is standardized. So there's a lot of things that can be attacked. I
think a basic issue is whether we're doing this just for rhetoric or
symbolism, or whether there is some other goal in mind, and I think
that an awful lot of anti-commodification has to do with the
symbolism and the rhetoric.
Why do we care about this? Why do we care about asking people
not to talk like Richard Posner and Gary Becker? They have a first
amendment right to do it; I'm not saying they don't, but why do we
wish they wouldn't? Why do we wish Posner hadn't written a book
called "Sex and Reason" which says that sex is only an economic
activity and all our choices about sexuality are merely disguised
choices about maximizing our profits? Why do we wish he hadn't
done that, why do we care? (Maybe I shouldn't say we; why do I or
some of us wish he hadn't done that?) First and foremost, I think we
care about this because we like our legal system to make a
commitment to an ideal-even if we're imperfect. We want the legal
system to make a commitment to an ideal of noncommodification of
love, family, and other commitments close to ourselves. And,
secondarily, there are these ideas about slippery slopes. Some people
think if we start talking about children as things we own, and about
one as being fungible with the other, and we expect them to maximize
our pleasure in life, we might start actually trading them some day.
So, when Gary Becker got the Nobel Prize, we thought (if we're
slippery slope-ists) this is going to make us closer some day to actually
buying and selling children. But I think those two reasons why we
should care are two different arguments. One is that we think
empirically in practice we're going to slide down the slope, but the
other is, even if we never slide down the slope, we think our legal
system should be expressive and should say something about our
ideal, even if we can't live up to it. We can't live up to our ideal of
freedom of speech or equal justice, but we think there should be an
equal protection clause. In a way, the reason we couldn't get the
Equal Rights Amendment passed was because we needed it so much.
Some of us thought it would be a good idea to have it just to say, "this
is what we care about." So, desire for expressive commitment is part
of the reason for anti-commodification regulation, and the rest of it
might be this slippery slope idea, which I'm not at all sure about. I
never have been. There could be a really stubborn commitment to
the core of non-market humanity such that however much selling of

July 2002]

CLONING AND COMMODIFICATION

kids goes on, we might stubbornly resist actually ever thinking about
kids as market commodities. I don't know how to test that. I don't
know whether it's true or not true.
How does all this apply to cloning? Here my thoughts are
tentative. How would regulation recognize the non-market status of
women, of children, of biological genetic components? One thing
regulation can do is improve safety, as we've been talking about.
That seems like the easiest argument. Now the safety argument could
be totally a market argument; it could be just the usual limits on
property and contract. After all, in contract we don't let people
defraud people, we don't let them tell lies about their product; we
have consumer protection. In property we delimit entitlements so
that we don't injure other people; we don't create nuisances, and so
on. We could just have the usual limits on property and contract, or
we could, with the safety regulation, be trying to achieve some
recognition of non-market status. Here I think the problems with the
non-regulation of IVF are really instructive. In spite of people's
commitment to informed consent as an ideal, it turns out we have this
industry that plays on people's hopes and takes them for lots of
money, yet doesn't ever have to disclose how unsuccessful it is, how
much pain there is, and how much women get hurt by it. On balance,
if you're a utilitarian, the fact that some people can get access to this
because they really want it, and they send emails to Mr. Eibert, and
the fact that the other people get hurt (because their hopes have been
dashed and they could have adopted ten years ago but they went
through all this and suffered) could well cause you to find the balance
tilting toward banning or heavily regulating these commercial fertility
firms. That's the sort of thing which could be regulated for either
non-market status reasons or possibly for market hygiene reasons;
that is, we could regulate to express with an incomplete
commodification a commitment to the nonmarket status of
procreation and children, or we could regulate simply so consumers
can be informed and get what they pay for. I was also interested in
Alex Capron's statement that "procreation becomes manufactured."
That's a nice slogan. It makes me think, "Is the problem with cloning
that we have an exchange and a commercial profit-making industry,
or is it something else?" When we say procreation becomes
manufactured, it looks like it's something else. It looks like he's
worried about standardization or fungibility. But maybe not. Maybe
if only one unit is manufactured then it wouldn't be fungible, it would
not be an exchange transaction, and money need not have anything to
do with it.
So what's the problem? Is the problem merely that the clone
comes into being in some way which seems unduly objectified?
That's unclear to me. There's another slippery slope or at least a
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continuum here. As some of you know, for the Catholic Church, sex
is objectified and therefore wrong unless you procreate in the normal
manner. I don't think they go so far as to say you must use the
missionary position, but they go pretty far toward thinking how you
have to do it, because everything else has this aura about it of not
being quite natural or right. So I think something like this might be
what's behind the "procreation becoming manufactured" argument,
and what's wrong with that needs some further thought. It's not
about the fact that we have exchange and commercial profit, it's
about something else, and maybe that something else is a concern
about fungibility, or lack of uniqueness. But if it's something other
than that, like somehow we use a process which isn't a process that
seems natural, that's something that needs some underlying
questioning.
Another thing regulation can do is forthrightly put limits on
profit, and that's an incomplete commodification in a sense. It says,
this is an industry that we don't want governed by the full laws of
capitalism; it isn't just about supply and demand, it's about something
else that we care about. That is the way we treat adoption, or the way
we try to. In other words, there would be a full-blown contract
pregnancy industry, I'm sure, if we allowed that, because there really
is demand out there for babies, especially certain types of babies.
There are other things that have limits on profit too. Rent control is
one, and there are lots of others. So we can openly put limits on
profit and that creates an incomplete commodification in a sense.
There are also these selective prohibitions-"you can do this but not
that." As justification for selective prohibition you can fall back on
safety but another reason for them relates to rhetoric or symbolism.
And then finally there's this thing that bothers me about trying
to keep apart exchange transactions and donative transactions, to
which this whole notion of commodification is related. The problem
is that a lot of these high-tech processes, and not just ones for
reproduction, have run into the issue that because it's more
ideologically pure to be a donor we see a donor at the beginning of
the chain and we have profit at the end. We have egg "donors," but
then we have profit-makers as the "donation" goes through the
system. It's no accident that the Moore case has made it into all the
property books: the man was an unwitting donor of his cells, while the
doctors, the hospital, and the university made big, big bucks through
propertization. Moore never saw any of it because the court objected
to its being called property. (The court did at least suggest that it
could be called a tort.) So we have egg donors, we have womb service
donors, we have cell donors, and all of these donors could end up
being cheated by incomplete commodification because people later
on in the chain are making all the money and the donors are not
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getting any of it. This is another one of those double-edged swords.
You either go all the way to commodification and pay the people who
started out, or you can go all the way to non-commodification and not
pay anybody or you can start limiting the profit further down the
chain. This is a complicated issue. Nobody today has mentioned it.
Maybe it comes later on in regulation, but I really think this is what
should be thought about with regulation.
I'm going to conclude by talking about some types of recurrent
anti-regulation arguments. They've been recurrent today, they're
recurrent in the committee report, and they're interesting. I think
they should be questioned, but that doesn't mean they have no
weight. First of all, I will divide the arguments against regulation into
two types. The first arguments are ideal arguments of principle, and
the second are the non-ideal arguments having to do with our
situation.
These non-ideal arguments are pragmatic and
consequentalist: what will happen if in our current circumstances we
try to ban this or we try to carry out these procedures? The lawyers
make this second argument. They say, all right, here we are and we
have to get from here to somewhere else. We have to really take into
account where we are now, all the cultural conditions, all the political
conditions, all the things that are lacking with the factual picture. The
ethicists and people of principle make the first argument-that is they
say if we had an ideal world, how could we think about this? The first
principles, the recurring ones, seem to be either religion or Kantian
personhood; those are the ones that recur. The religious arguments
per se are supposed to be constitutionally illegitimate, but they're the
most important to many of our people, and I think, therefore, at least
we should take seriously that they are the most important arguments
to many of our people. The Kantian argument is preferred by secular
ethicists; it emphasizes respect for personhood, saying that if
something is a.person it's not an object, and we have to treat it as an
end not a means. The Kantian argument cuts both ways. Respect for
personhood may mean that all technological opportunities for
reproduction and the opportunity to spend your money in the market
should be allowed. Kant thought that property should extend to the
furthest reaches of all objects in the universe so that we could express
our personhood. On the other hand, we could say that it limits
personhood and self-constitution to let these things get placed
partway in the object realm. So I think we can't get there from here
on the ideal argument. It cuts both ways or is undecidable in the
abstract. That's my personal opinion, but I'm a lawyer.
I want to mention four of the non-ideal and the circumstantial
arguments that keep recurring. The first one I call Why pick on me?
I wish I had a good slide with this. Why pick on me, I'm just the latest
in a chain of non-ideal practices, and you haven't picked on the early
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ones. What about commodification of youth and beauty? What
about cosmetic surgery? We haven't moved to ban those. We
haven't moved to provide them for poor people. We have let the
market call forth a great flourishing of commodified youth and
beauty, and so on and so on. That's the why pick on me argument.
I've seen that one quite a bit in this debate, and I'm sure that you
have too.
The second argument that I see a lot is Money will out anyway,
so let's be honest. There's an inexorable power of demand with
money behind it and no matter what you do, if there's demand and
people have money, there will be these clinics and cloned humans.
There will be all this stuff whether you like it or not and therefore you
should legalize it. Think of prostitution or campaign contributions.
Money will out and let's be honest. I think Richard Posner is one of
the main people on this, but you hear it a lot. Two things about this:
if you prohibit something when there's a lot of demand and money to
pay for it, there will be a black market. This is terrible; it's very
inefficient if you're an economist. If you're not an economist, you say
things like, "the mafia will run it." Drug regulation-there's another
example. There will be a black market, and the mafia will run it, the
money will out. The Posners of the world are consistent; some of the
rest of us aren't. They say, look, there should be drug legalization
and prostitution legalization as well as legalization of all this other
stuff. But I guess he's against cloning, so maybe he's not so
consistent. The second thing is if you try to ban something and
there's demand for it, and money behind it, there will be this sliding
that Alex Capron talked about. Therapeutic research will be used for
reproductive cloning and you just can't hold it apart in practice
because there's demand and there's money and it will happen. That's
the second part of the money will out argument-regulations will be
evaded and bent to serve the demand as long as there is money
behind it.
The third argument is that the normal method of reproduction is
pretty non-ideal too. There are dangers with sexual reproduction,
there are bad reasons that people have children, and there are bad
ways they treat their children (they are abusive, they neglect them,
they have them for stupid reasons). I guess this relates to number
one, why pick on me. We have a long chain of other methods of
reproduction including surrogacy and IVF-but we also have regular
sex which is pretty non-ideal. People give their children HIV, people
abuse them, people give them cocaine addictions-not just Tay-Sachs
disease.
Number four is that if you regulate something, you might
exacerbate the divide between rich and poor, the double bind. I don't
know which way this cuts with cloning. It's true that only rich people
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are going to purchase cloning and that only rich people do purchase
surrogacy, IVF, and cosmetic surgery. Even adoption costs a bundle.
So the question is, what should we do with the argument, only rich
people can do X? Here's another regulatory alternative-if you can't
lick 'em, join 'em. That's the alternative of charging large license fees
or taxes. If you believe number two, which is that money is going to
come anyway, if you believe the real ever-increasing class divide, and
if you think the demand is intractable-you give up on trying to
prevent commercialization, but you charge a large license fee or a tax
and you earmark it for those who can't afford the treatment or who
need the education or whatever. That's tobacco, that's the California
lottery, that's lots of things. So that's an alternative, too, which I
think should be thought about here, at least when that argument is
raised.
I'm going to conclude with a list of problems (I must be an
ethicist at heart!). One, there are liberation arguments on both sides,
so there's indeterminacy. Two, there's this problem of blurring of the
language of gift and exchange or the regimes of gift and exchange
because we have donors at the beginning and profits at the endsometimes unwittingly, but when it does become witting there's an
increase in cynicism, I must say. Next, is it too late because of earlier
practices? How far gone are we? Are we so commodified that we
should just give up thinking about it, and if not, where do we start if
we can't start with the latest practice? And then, here's one that I
think should be thought about and hasn't been thought about enough
even yet, how much should we take as a given people's attachment to
their own genetic material?
Should we really interpret our
Constitution as guaranteeing the right to a biological family? I mean
it's one thing to say there's a right to a family, but is that a right to a
biological family versus adoption or mixed practices, or some other
ways that people create families? I know that it's true that people are
attached to their genetic material, but just to speak personally, I've
known people who have tried IVF and failed after great suffering and
ended up adopting. They then found out belatedly that caring for an
adopted child results in as much caring as anybody can give and as
full an experience of family as anybody can have. It would be
wonderful if people knew that more than they now do, although many
people do know it. My final thought is that we lawyers worry about
the problem of policing. Whatever you try and pass, whatever kind of
regulation it is, you have to think carefully about how it's going to be
policed. Obviously there's been a lot of ridicule about investigating
what's going on in the bedroom, but from a policing point of view,
there's nobody looking into the bedroom. When birth control in the
bedroom was prohibited, the prohibition was widely violated. If you
care about this issue, you have to write any regulation in such a way
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that people can investigate what's happening. If you believe that
every statute degenerates into industry capture because of the
inexorable power of money, then you have a very serious problem
about how to regulate something without having it degenerate into
the demand of the market. That's the problem that I leave you with,
but I think it should be thought about seriously.
Thank you.

